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SOVEREIGNTY-BASED DEFENSES IN 
ANTITRUST CASES AGAINST CHINESE 
MANUFACTURERS: MAKING ROOM FOR 
DIPLOMACY 
INTRODUCTION 
wo-thousand eight was a year of firsts for the Chinese govern-
ment. China hosted the Olympics for the first time; its first com-
prehensive competition legislation (the “Anti-Monopoly Law”) took ef-
fect; and a U.S. court refused to dismiss the first U.S. antitrust suit 
against Chinese manufacturers, despite the Chinese government’s first 
appearance as amicus curiae before a U.S. court on the manufacturers’ 
behalf. These last two “firsts” are particularly important since they may 
signal an incoming tide of U.S. antitrust suits against Chinese manufac-
turers in response to China’s increasing dominance in many global indus-
tries. 
Antitrust suits against Chinese exporters present U.S. courts with spe-
cial challenges due to China’s continuing transition from a centrally 
planned to a market economy and the resulting upheavals in the coun-
try’s legal, economic, and regulatory systems. Chinese policymakers 
have recently begun to accept the principle that competition is a neces-
sary engine of economic growth, as evidenced by China’s newly enacted 
Anti-Monopoly Law (“AML”).1 Furthermore, as part of an effort to re-
duce government control over many sectors, China has removed some 
powerful ministries from direct administration by the state and replaced 
them with so-called “trade associations” or “chambers of commerce,” 
groups that play an important role in influencing the pricing decisions of 
otherwise private entities.2 
While China instituted these reforms in the name of increased competi-
tion, a deeply embedded economic culture of price coordination and 
skepticism about the merits of competition is unlikely to be upended so 
easily. For instance, while the term “trade association” may signify an 
independent industry-run organization in the United States, the Chinese 
trade associations retain close ties to the official state apparatus. Thus, 
                                                                                                             
 1. See Bruce M. Owen, Su Sun & Wentong Zheng, China’s Competition Policy 
Reforms: The Anti-Monopoly Law and Beyond, 75 ANTITRUST L.J. 231, 232 (2008) [he-
reinafter Owen, Sun & Zheng, China’s Competition Policy Reforms]. 
 2. See id. at 240; see also Jonathan Palmer, China’s Landmark Anti-Trust Law, 
LEXISNEXIS EMERGING ISSUES ANALYSIS, July 19, 2008, at 5, available at LEXIS, 2008 
Emerging Issues 2558 (noting the common practice of trade associations to become en-
meshed in the pricing decisions of their members). 
T 
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there is potential for much confusion over the nature of the trade associa-
tions, and whether pricing decisions of their members, ostensibly private 
entities, are truly voluntary. Against this complex regulatory backdrop, 
Chinese manufacturers have steadily gained a stronger foothold in world 
markets. Perhaps unsurprisingly, this success recently attracted the filing 
of several prominent U.S. antitrust cases alleging that Chinese manufac-
turers and their trade associations participated in price-fixing schemes 
aimed at inflating prices for the U.S. market.3 
The ambiguities in China’s changing regulatory structure and the 
state’s involvement in pricing decisions open the door for Chinese manu-
facturers to test the use of special defenses based on respecting the sove-
reignty of foreign states—namely, the doctrines of Act of State, Comity, 
and Foreign Sovereign Compulsion. Whether U.S. federal courts will 
give broad latitude to such defenses in a trial on the merits remains to be 
seen, but a preliminary decision in a case against vitamin C manufactur-
ers, In re Vitamin C Antitrust Litigation, could be an important predictor 
of the success of a new wave of antitrust cases against Chinese manufac-
turers. This Note argues that in cases where the Chinese government’s 
role in anti-competitive acts is at least ambiguous, U.S. courts should 
construe sovereignty-based defenses broadly in order to make room for 
diplomacy and serve important policy considerations. 
Part I of this Note discusses the changing nature of China’s antitrust 
regime from a regulatory and legal standpoint. Part II provides an over-
view of the Act of State, Foreign Sovereign Compulsion, and Comity 
doctrines. Part III reviews the assertion of these doctrines as defenses and 
their treatment by a federal district court in In re Vitamin C Antitrust Lit-
igation. Part IV analyzes the various policy considerations that should 
inform a court’s decision about whether to allow such defenses in ambi-
guous cases. Finally, Part V attempts to highlight lessons learned from 
the current litigation and suggests best practices for Chinese manufactur-
ers, the Chinese government, and the federal courts going forward. 
                                                                                                             
 3. See, e.g., In re Vitamin C Antitrust Litig., 584 F. Supp. 2d 546 (E.D.N.Y. 2008); 
Animal Sci. Prods., Inc. v. China Nat’l Metals & Minerals Imp. & Exp. Corp., 596 F. 
Supp. 2d 842 (D.N.J. 2008); see also Owen, Sun & Zheng, China’s Competition Policy 
Reforms, supra note 1, at 250 n.53 (“The antitrust problems associated with [China’s] 
competition-limiting policies [for its export industries] were perhaps first brought to the 
attention of the Chinese policy makers by three antitrust lawsuits filed in the United 
States in 2005 and 2006 alleging price fixing by Chinese exporters of vitamin C, magne-
site, and bauxite.”). 
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I. CHINA’S CHANGING ANTITRUST REGIME 
In the late 1970s, China began a historic transformation from a central-
ly planned, socialist economy to a more open, market-oriented econo-
my.4 Under the centrally planned system, government ministries for each 
major industry coordinated production schedules and set prices, and no 
real “competition” occurred since all the industries were comprised of 
state-owned enterprises (“SOEs”).5 During the reform period, the gov-
ernment retained SOEs in certain critical industries, but relinquished 
ownership of others that were deemed less important for the government 
to control directly.6 In these newly privatized industries, China estab-
lished “trade associations” or “chambers of commerce” with regulatory 
and coordination authority to replace the government ministries.7 How-
ever, this attempt at deregulation was not completely successful in sepa-
rating the private sector from government control. As one commentator 
put it, “in reality many of the [trade] associations thus organized are little 
more than government ministries in disguise,” which “often sanction an-
ticompetitive practices by their members.”8 Although confusingly desig-
nated as “social organization[s]” under Chinese law, the trade associa-
tions did not spring up at the election of private industry, as the term 
might suggest.9 Rather, the trade associations are mandated and largely 
controlled by the government, making them, in practice, more akin to 
government instrumentalities.10 
                                                                                                             
 4. See Kevin X. Li & Ming Du, Does China Need Competition Law?, J. OF BUS. L., 
Mar. 2007, at 183, 184. 
 5. Bruce M. Owen, Su Sun & Wentong Zheng, Antitrust in China: The Problem of 
Incentive Compatibility, 1 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 123, 129 (2005) [hereinafter 
Owen, Sun & Zheng, Antitrust in China]. 
 6. Owen, Sun & Zheng, China’s Competition Policy Reforms, supra note 1, at 240 
(stating that industries deemed “essential” to the economy and development of the nation 
include “electricity, petroleum, banking, insurance, railroads, and aviation”). 
 7. Id. 
 8. Owen, Sun & Zheng, Antitrust in China, supra note 5, at 130. 
 9. Brief of Amicus Curiae The Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of 
China in Support of the Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the Complaint at 8, In re Vitamin  
Antitrust Litig., 584 F.Supp. 2d 546 (E.D.N.Y. 2008) (No. 06-MD-1730) [hereinafter 
Ministry Amicus Curiae Brief]. 
 10. See id. at 9 (“The Ministry’s authority over the Chamber [of Commerce] is ple-
nary: covering such aspects as the Chamber’s selection of its leaders, its personnel man-
agement system, its budge and accounting systems and its salary structure . . . . In short, 
the Chamber is the instrumentality through which the Ministry oversees and regulates the 
business of importing and exporting medicinal products in China.”). 
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To accompany this rapid economic restructuring, China soon recog-
nized that laws addressing competition and monopolization would be 
necessary under a more open system.11 The piecemeal institution of the 
initial laws and administrative rules, however, failed to have a pervasive 
effect on curbing anticompetitive practices, due in part to a lack of im-
plementing mechanisms and irregular enforcement dispersed among var-
ious government agencies.12 In the early 1990’s, economic reforms really 
began to gather speed following the Communist Party’s official declara-
tion that its “central goal” was to “establish a ‘socialist market econo-
my.’”13 Thus, the fledgling private sector began rapidly gaining market 
share in the absence of cohesive antitrust laws or predictable enforce-
ment.14 In 1994, China sought to remedy the inefficiencies, inconsisten-
cies, and gaps in the existing patchwork of rules by actively pursuing the 
drafting of its first comprehensive competition law, the AML.15 
Drafting the AML proved a difficult and lengthy task given the highly 
controversial nature of “competition” as a policy goal in the eyes of 
many Chinese policymakers.16 These policymakers and academics be-
lieved that the main problem with the economy was “excessive” compe-
tition, not a lack of competition.17 This view was fueled by the expe-
rience of several domestic industries in which intense competition led 
private enterprises to cut prices below costs, sometimes via illegal tac-
tics.18 Skeptics of competition law feared—perhaps understandably—
                                                                                                             
 11. See Li & Du, supra note 4, at 184. Previously, the economy was made up of 
SOEs whose production was determined by government plan, rather than the rules of 
supply and demand. Id. at 183. Therefore, the “socialist planned economy left no room 
for the competitive process to operate in general, and competition law was irrelevant.” Id. 
 12. See id. at 184; see also Owen, Sun & Zheng, China’s Competition Policy Re-
forms, supra note 1, at 236 (“China’s antitrust laws and regulations prior to the AML 
were fragmented, vague, and repetitive, and the effectiveness of antitrust enforcement 
was hampered by the existence of multiple enforcement agencies authorized by different 
laws.”). 
 13. Owen, Sun & Zheng, China’s Competition Policy Reforms, supra note 1, at 239. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. at 232. 
 16. In fact, the drafting process took about thirteen years. Nathan Bush, The PRC 
Antimonopoly Law: Unanswered Questions and Challenges Ahead, THE ANTITRUST 
SOURCE, Oct. 2007, at 1, available at http://www.abanet.org/antitrust/at-
source/07/10/Oct07-Bush10-18f.pdf. 
 17. Owen, Sun & Zheng, China’s Competition Policy Reforms, supra note 1, at 249. 
 18. Id. Some examples include travel agencies resorting to paying customers to use 
their services, maritime shipping companies operating at a loss, and dairy producers using 
illegal cost-cutting measures that resulted in health risks. Id. Arguably though, these acts 
are not “excessive” competition at all, but rather “competition going awry. Common to 
 
2010] MAKING ROOM FOR DIPLOMACY 341 
that this type of race to the bottom competition among domestic entities 
would prevent the new Chinese private sector from being a strong player 
in the international market.19 Fears about excessive competition also ex-
tended to China’s export sector, where excessive competition is often 
blamed for the fact that recently, “Chinese products have been the num-
ber one target of antidumping investigations initiated by members of the 
WTO.”20 
To deal with this widely perceived problem of excessive competition, 
the government imposed “industrial self-discipline” and “advance ap-
proval” requirements on private enterprises.21 Trade associations helped 
to introduce “industrial self-discipline” as a way to help achieve their 
mandate of stabilizing markets in the newly privatized sectors, but in 
1998 the practice became “officially sanctioned by the government.”22 
Industrial self-discipline requires “the major companies in an industry 
[to] reach price agreements or other agreements to limit competition.”23 
This coordination is now achieved “under the direct supervision of the 
government.”24 In 2003, the Chinese government imposed an additional 
“advance approval” requirement for certain goods in an effort to avoid 
antidumping investigations and duties imposed on its exporters by for-
eign governments.25 Under the advance approval system, trade associa-
tions must sign off on export contracts before those goods can be re-
leased for export.26 
Scholars have recognized that “policies such as ‘industrial self-
discipline’ and ‘advance approval,’ to a large degree, function simply as 
                                                                                                             
almost all is the fact that the competitors have engaged in illegal, or even criminal, acts 
that violate the existing competition laws, product safety laws, and consumer protection 
laws or would have violated the AML were it in effect.” Id. at 251. It is not surprising 
that a market undergoing such rapid transformation would experience some disarray in 
pricing as new companies attempt to establish a foothold in the newly formed private 
sector, particularly since before 1978, “the government . . . set prices for almost all goods 
and services.” Owen, Sun & Zheng, Antitrust in China, supra note 5, at 126–27. 
 19. Owen, Sun & Zheng, China’s Competition Policy Reforms, supra note 1, at 249 
(“What China needs, they believe, is to consolidate the smaller companies into bigger and 
stronger ones that can compete in the international markets.”). 
 20. Id. at 248. 
 21. Id. at 249. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. at 248. 
 25. Id. at 249. 
 26. Id. 
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government-sponsored price cartels.”27 Consequently, these practices 
form the basis of the U.S. antitrust suit In re Vitamin C Antitrust Litiga-
tion, discussed, infra, in Section III. The irony, of course, is that while 
U.S. antitrust plaintiffs now claim that Chinese manufacturers are con-
spiring to keep prices artificially high, it seems that this coordinated pric-
ing grew largely out of a desire to avoid U.S. antidumping suits where 
the complaint was that Chinese export prices were artificially low. Thus, 
while coordinating and enforcing a floor for export prices under these 
policies might have helped exporters to avoid dumping allegations, it 
also exposed Chinese exporters to U.S. antitrust suits based on the anti-
competitive act of price-fixing. 
Although practices like industrial self-discipline and advance approval 
show China’s enduring impulse to intervene in the market, the passage of 
the AML represented a significant coup for pro-competition policymak-
ers. After thirteen years of drafting, negotiations, and revisions, the Na-
tional People’s Congress (“NPC”) finally adopted the AML on August 
30, 2007.28 The law took effect on August 1, 2008.29 While it is certainly 
a big step toward modernizing China’s approach to curbing anticompeti-
tive practices, the AML is considerably less nuanced than the advanced 
antitrust regimes it ostensibly sought to emulate, perhaps reflecting Chi-
na’s continuing ambivalence toward Western conceptions of “competi-
tion.”30 Thus, many of the key decisions regarding implementation and 
enforcement of the AML are only now beginning to come to light 
                                                                                                             
 27. Id. The authors note that “in implementing those policies, the government appar-
ently was unconcerned about their antitrust implication in domestic markets” until law-
suits were actually filed in the U.S. in 2005 and 2006. Id. This perhaps shows how 
strongly the government was focusing on avoiding dumping investigations by ensuring 
export prices were not lower than home market prices, even if it meant getting the gov-
ernment involved in pricing. Prior to the privatization of some SOEs, the government had 
little reason to become adept at anticipating antitrust enforcement in the U.S. because the 
government and its SOEs would likely be entitled to immunity from suit under the For-
eign Sovereign Immunities Act (“FSIA”). 
 28. Bush, supra note 16, at 1. The process was infused with new urgency upon Chi-
na’s accession to the WTO in 2001, since many experts felt that China would need a 
comprehensive law in order to meet its WTO obligations. Id. 
 29. See id. 
 30. Id. at 2 (noting that the vagueness of the law as written “provid[es] ample textual 
hooks for serving alternate policy goals.”). Indeed, the enunciated aims in the AML vary 
from “promoting ‘efficiency’ and ‘consumer interests’ to advancing ‘fair market competi-
tion,’ ‘the public interest,’ and ‘the healthy development of the socialist market econo-
my.’” Id. These goals can hardly be considered an unambiguous endorsement of West-
ern-style antitrust goals. 
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through implementing regulations and the case-by-case decisions of judi-
cial or administrative authorities interpreting AML provisions.31 
The AML covers the three basic areas of competition law common to 
modern jurisdictions: merger control, monopoly agreements, and abuse 
of dominance.32 Prohibited horizontal monopoly agreements among peer 
firms include “price fixing, market division, bid-rigging, joint boycotts, 
technology restrictions, and other restrictive agreements.”33 However, 
Article 15 of the AML provides for broad exemptions from these restric-
tions, including potentially worrisome “exemptions for crisis cartels, ex-
port cartels, and unspecified ‘public interests’” that could leave room for 
some anticompetitive practices to continue uninhibited.34 
In addition to these typical antitrust provisions, the AML deals with 
several contentious competition issues that are specific to the Chinese 
context, including the role played by the trade associations.35 The sec-
tions covering trade associations were last-minute additions to the AML 
aimed at addressing concerns over recent price-fixing and market divi-
sion scandals.36 Article 11 specifically calls upon trade associations to 
“strengthen the self-discipline of industries and to lead undertakings 
within their respective industries to carry out lawful competition and to 
protect the market competition order.”37 This provision seems to envision 
the continuation of the trade associations as market stabilizers, but 
throws in the word “lawful” to temper what those stabilization efforts 
may encompass. Even more explicitly, Article 16 provides that “industry 
associations shall not organize undertakings within their industries” in a 
                                                                                                             
 31. Id. at 2. See also Owen, Sun & Zheng, Antitrust in China, supra note 5, at 127 
(noting that vagueness in initial antitrust statutes is not uncommon, and allows for the 
interpretation of the law to develop over time). In the U.S., the Sherman Act became 
nuanced through the development of the common law in accordance with economic 
theory over half a century. In China, it is possible that “administrative agenc[ies] can 
develop policies and procedures which, if made public and followed consistently, can 
provide guidance equivalent to case law.” Id. 
 32. Palmer, supra note 2, at 1. With regard to agreements, the AML prohibits private 
enterprises from engaging in three types of conduct: “anticompetitive ‘monopoly agree-
ments,’ abuses of dominant market positions, and concentrations that are likely to elimi-
nate or restrict competition.” Bush, supra note 16, at 2. 
 33. Palmer, supra note 2, at 1. 
 34. Bush, supra note 16, at 7.  
 35. Palmer, supra note 2, at 1. (“[I]ssues of specific concern in China [covered in the 
AML include]: (1) the abuse of administrative power; (2) protection of the state-owned 
sector; (3) protection of intellectual property rights; and (4) the role of trade associa-
tions.”). 
 36. Bush, supra note 16, at 10. 
 37. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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way that would violate the AML provisions on monopoly agreements.38 
The AML thus seems to acknowledge that although “China’s policymak-
ers see a positive role of the government-agencies-turned-trade associa-
tions in regulating market order,” there remains the “risk . . . that the 
trade associations may cross the line and impose undue restrictions on 
competition or, in some cases, function as outright price cartels.”39 
Penalties authorized by the AML “for entering monopoly agreements 
and abuses of dominance include confiscation of illegal gains, fines of 
one percent to ten percent of the offenders’ total turnover from the pre-
ceding year, and orders to cease the offending conduct.”40 Enterprises 
have some incentive to self-report misconduct and provide evidence in 
exchange for a reduction in or immunity from the imposition of penalties 
by administrative enforcement agencies.41 
In sum, the AML contains many of the features one would expect from 
a modern competition statute, as well as some promising attempts to ad-
dress problems unique to the Chinese economy and system of govern-
ment, but the ultimate test of its efficacy will be in its implementation 
and enforcement. Thus far, enforcement under the AML has focused al-
most solely on merger clearance, and already the main critique is a ten-
dency to use the AML to protect domestic competitors.42 It remains to be 
seen how the Chinese enforcement agencies and courts will treat price-
fixing and other horizontal restraints on trade that may involve question-
ing the role of the government ministries and the trade associations in 
market activity.43 It will certainly take time for the Chinese economy and 
private sector to adjust to the recent constraints imposed by China’s first 
comprehensive competition law. 
                                                                                                             
 38. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 39. Owen, Sun & Zheng, China’s Competition Policy Reforms, supra note 1, at 250. 
 40. Bush, supra note 16, at 11. 
 41. Id. Depending on how it is utilized, this provision may be similar to the highly 
successful leniency programs in the U.S. and elsewhere, which have facilitated many 
antitrust prosecutions. Id. 
 42. Oliver Antoine & Jonathan Zhou, Chinese Enforcement Evolves, N.Y. L.J., May 
11, 2009, at 10, available at 
http://www.law.com/jsp/nylj/PubArticleNY.jsp?id=1202430560684&slreturn=1&hbxlogi
n=1. 
 43. One commentator has called the failure to enforce the AML against cartels the 
“elephant in the room.” Id. 
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II. OVERVIEW OF SOVEREIGNTY-BASED DEFENSES: ACT OF STATE, 
FOREIGN SOVEREIGN COMPULSION, AND COMITY DOCTRINES 
The common thread tying together the Act of State, Foreign Sovereign 
Compulsion, and Comity doctrines is reluctance for the U.S. Judicial 
Branch to impinge on the sovereignty of other independent states.44 
When used as a defense in federal antitrust cases, each of these doctrines 
requires the court to engage in some type of threshold analysis aimed at 
determining how far it may venture into the area of international affairs 
while maintaining the utmost respect for the sovereign acts of other 
states. Thus, for the purposes of this Note, the three doctrines are referred 
to as the “sovereignty-based defenses.” Each doctrine, and its role as a 
defense in U.S. federal litigation, is considered in turn. 
A. Act of State Doctrine 
The common law Act of State doctrine provides grounds for dismissal 
of a private antitrust action if the “claim for injury . . . results directly 
from acts or decisions of a foreign sovereign and only indirectly from the 
defendant’s unlawful anticompetitive activities.”45 The effect of asserting 
the doctrine as a defense is that it “generally precludes federal courts 
from inquiring into the validity of public acts which a recognized foreign 
sovereign power commits within its own territory and consequently pro-
hibits federal antitrust suits predicated on the acts of a foreign sovereign, 
even where the acts are procured by private parties.”46 
The most important aspect of the doctrine is the focus on “validity”—
U.S. courts avoid deciding any case that turns on questioning the validity 
                                                                                                             
 44. WILLIAM C. HOLMES, ANTITRUST LAW HANDBOOK § 8:10 (2008). 
 45. 48 C.J.S. International Law § 31 (2009). Note however, that the Act of State doc-
trine, like the other doctrines discussed in this Note, is a generally applicable defense and 
therefore is not confined to use in antitrust cases. 
 46. 23 FED. PROC., L. ED. § 54:140 (2009). However, there are some exceptional cir-
cumstances under which the doctrine is inapplicable as a defense, i.e. where the govern-
ment allegedly acted in a purely commercial capacity. Id. The non-invoking party may 
also question whether the challenged act should qualify under the doctrine. RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 443 (1987) (“The act of state doctrine applies to 
acts such as constitutional amendments, statutes, decrees and proclamations, and in cer-
tain circumstances to physical acts . . . . An official pronouncement by a foreign govern-
ment describing a certain act as governmental is ordinarily conclusive evidence of its 
official character. An action or declaration by an official may qualify as an act of state, 
but only upon a showing (ordinarily by the party raising the issue) that the official had 
authority to act for and bind the state.”). 
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of a state action.47 As traditionally stated in American law, the Act of 
State doctrine is rooted in the principle that: 
Every sovereign state is bound to respect the independence of every 
other sovereign state, and the courts of one country will not sit in 
judgment on the acts of the government of another, done within its own 
territory. Redress of grievances by reason of such acts must be obtained 
through the means open to be availed of by sovereign powers as be-
tween themselves.48 
Thus, the doctrine is rooted in both respect for the sovereignty of inde-
pendent nations and in the notion of separation of powers that is at the 
core of the American system of government.49 
The leading modern case in this area of the law is Banco Nacional de 
Cuba v. Sabbatino, which recognized that the judge-made Act of State 
doctrine developed, at least in part, out of a “strong sense of the Judicial 
Branch that its engagement in the task of passing on the validity of for-
eign acts of state may hinder rather than further this country’s pursuit of 
goals both for itself and for the community of nations as a whole in the 
international sphere.”50 The case, dealing with the expropriation of pri-
vate property resulting from a Cuban decree, established that the Act of 
State doctrine applies even when the state act involved would constitute 
a violation of international law.51 The Court reasoned that the Executive 
Branch has at its disposal numerous diplomatic channels through which 
to address grievances on behalf of all its citizens in response to the acts 
of another sovereign, while the Judicial Branch can only afford piece-
meal relief based on the individual facts and actors that happen to be be-
fore it.52 The Court concluded that decisions declaring a foreign sove-
reign’s acts invalid would be “likely to give offense . . . since the concept 
                                                                                                             
 47. See Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 304 (1918) (“To permit the va-
lidity of the acts of one sovereign state to be reexamined and perhaps condemned by the 
courts of another would very certainly imperil the amicable relations between govern-
ments and vex the peace of nations.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 48. Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897). 
 49. See THOMAS V. VAKERICS, ANTITRUST BASICS § 12.05 (2009); In re Vitamin C 
Antitrust Litig., 584 F. Supp. 2d 546, 550 (E.D.N.Y. 2008); see also Banco Nacional de 
Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 421–23 (1964) (noting that “historic notions of sove-
reign authority” show the wisdom of the Act of State doctrine, while the separation of 
powers system gives rise to the doctrine). 
 50. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 423. However, the Court also notes, without elaborating, 
that some scholars disagree about the scope of the rule and the policy considerations that 
underpin it. Id. at 424. 
 51. Id. at 431. 
 52. See id. 
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of territorial sovereignty is so deep seated [that] any state may resent the 
refusal of the courts of another sovereign to accord validity to acts within 
its territorial borders.”53 
Any judicial disposition on the validity of an act of state would un-
doubtedly, in the Court’s view, impinge on the ability of the Executive 
Branch to negotiate optimal relations and agreements with other states.54 
If the court declares a sovereign state’s act invalid, this could undermine 
a carefully calibrated response (or non-response) by the Executive 
Branch.55 If the court declares the act valid, this approval may give the 
sovereign state leverage in negotiations with the Executive Branch, or 
may undermine the authority of the Executive Branch if it has already 
officially expressed disapproval.56 
Thus, in order to effectively assert the Act of State doctrine as a de-
fense, a defendant must allege that the outcome of the case requires the 
court “to declare as invalid the official act of a foreign sovereign where 
that act was performed within that sovereign’s own territory.”57 Unlike 
the doctrine of sovereign immunity, the Act of State defense may be 
raised whether or not the foreign government has been named as a de-
fendant in the case, and is a “policy of judicial abstention” rather than 
one of exception or immunity from the court’s jurisdiction.58 This means 
that a defendant need not be a state actor or agent to raise the defense, 
and the court may dismiss the case despite having one or more valid 
grounds for exercising jurisdiction. 
As clarified by the U.S. Supreme Court in W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co., Inc. 
v. Environmental Tectonics Corp., International, the proper procedure is 
to first determine the availability of the Act of State doctrine and only 
then to consider whether the circumstances in the case warrant its appli-
                                                                                                             
 53. Id. at 432. 
 54. See id. at 432–33. 
 55. See id. at 432. 
 56. See id. 
 57. VAKERICS, supra note 49, § 12.05. 
 58. HOLMES, supra note 44, § 8:10; see also VAKERICS, supra note 49, § 12.05; Int’l 
Ass’n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Org. of the Petrol. Exporting Countries, 
649 F.2d 1354, 1359 (9th Cir. 1981) (Noting that while foreign sovereign immunity is a 
jurisdictional principle of international law, the Act of State doctrine is a “prudential” 
American legal principle arising out of the separation of powers system. Rather than 
going to jurisdiction, therefore, the doctrine allows courts to avoid acting in a politically 
sensitive area of foreign relations that is better suited to the political branches of govern-
ment.). 
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cation.59 The Act of State doctrine is not technically available to the 
court as a ground for dismissal until it becomes unavoidably necessary to 
rule on the validity of a state action.60 The court must then decide wheth-
er to apply the doctrine based on the degree to which the case implicates 
the policies underlying the doctrine, including “international comity, re-
spect for the sovereignty of foreign nations on their own territory, and 
the avoidance of embarrassment to the Executive Branch in its conduct 
of foreign relations.”61 While a high probability of embarrassment or in-
sult to a foreign state provides support to an argument in favor of apply-
ing the Act of State doctrine, it is not an element the defendant is re-
quired to prove in order to assert the defense, nor is it sufficient on its 
own to warrant dismissal of a case on Act of State grounds.62 After Kirk-
patrick, it appears that the court may decide not to apply the Act of State 
doctrine, even where it is technically available, if the balance of consid-
erations weighs against deferral to the political branches.63 However, the 
only example the Court provided to illustrate when the balance might 
weigh against invoking the doctrine was when the sovereign act was that 
of a now defunct government.64 
B. Foreign Sovereign Compulsion Doctrine 
The Foreign Sovereign Compulsion doctrine may be considered an 
adaptation of the Act of State doctrine, in that it also operates as a shield 
for private defendants where the acts of a foreign sovereign are directly 
                                                                                                             
 59. W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co., Inc. v. Envtl. Tectonics Corp., Int’l, 493 U.S. 400, 409 
(1990). 
 60. Id. at 406. 
 61. Id. at 408. 
 62. Id. at 409. 
 63. Id. (citing with approval the Court’s suggested balancing approach as outlined in 
Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 428 (1964)). In Sabbatino, the 
Court suggested that the balance might shift against application of the doctrine if: (1) the 
case does not involve important implications for the nation’s foreign relations, (2) “the 
government which perpetrated the challenged act is no longer in existence[,]” or (3) there 
is a great “degree of codification or consensus concerning [the] particular area of interna-
tional law.” Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 428. 
 64. W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co., Inc. v. Envtl. Tectonics Corp., Int’l, 493 U.S. at 409. 
Presumably, the rationale is that deciding the validity of such an act would have no 
chance of interfering with the Executive Branch’s role in foreign affairs. However, it is 
possible to imagine many situations in which ruling on the validity of a former govern-
ment’s acts would still impinge on current relations among sovereigns. For instance, key 
figures from a former regime may also be part of a current government; or there may be 
similar ideologies underlying both governments; or the act of the former government may 
be one that carries particular significance to an ongoing national or international conflict. 
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involved in the claim of injury.65 However, the Foreign Sovereign Com-
pulsion defense only becomes available to the defendant in an antitrust 
suit if the “record demonstrates that the actions alleged to constitute the 
antitrust violations were in fact compelled by a foreign sovereign.”66 The 
underlying theory is that “where conduct is compelled by a foreign gov-
ernment, the corporate conduct, in effect, is the same as if it were the act 
of the foreign government itself. As a result, conduct compelled by a for-
eign sovereign is immune from antitrust prosecution.”67 
U.S. courts first recognized Foreign Sovereign Compulsion as a sepa-
rate defense in the context of an antitrust suit, Interamerican Refining 
Corp. v. Texaco Maracaibo, Inc.68 In that case, which involved boycot-
ting the sale of Venezuelan crude oil, the U.S. District Court for the Dis-
trict of Delaware granted the defendant supplier’s motion for summary 
judgment on the basis that the Venezuelan government had prohibited all 
oil suppliers and traders doing business in Venezuela from providing the 
                                                                                                             
 65. See 54 AM. JUR. 2D Monopolies and Restraints of Trade § 334 (2009); see also 
VAKERICS, supra note 49, § 12.05; HOLMES, supra note 44, § 8:10 (noting that while “ar-
ticulated as a separate defense, [foreign sovereign compulsion] has probably been sub-
sumed within the act of state doctrine” given the Supreme Court’s construction of the 
defense in W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co., Inc.). 
 66. 54 AM. JUR. 2D Monopolies and Restraints of Trade § 334 (2009). 
 67. VAKERICS, supra note 49, § 12.05. As set forth by the American Law Institute, the 
defense of Foreign Sovereign Compulsion encompasses the following: 
(1)  In general, a state may not require a person 
(a) to do an act in another state that is prohibited by the law of that 
state or by the law of the state of which he is a national; or 
(b) to refrain from doing an act in another state that is required by the 
law of that state or by the law of the state of which he is a national. 
(2)  In general, a state may require a person of foreign nationality 
(a) to do an act in that state even if it is prohibited by the law of the 
state of which he is a national; or 
(b) to refrain from doing an act in that state even if it is required by 
the law of the state of which he is a national. 
John W. Boscariol, An Anatomy of a Cuban Pyjama Crisis: Reconsidering Blocking Leg-
islation in Response to Extraterritorial Trade Measures of the United States, 30 LAW & 
POL’Y INT’L BUS. 439, 480 (1999) (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN 
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 441 (1986)). 
 68. See Interamerican Refining Corp. v. Texaco Maracaibo, Inc., 307 F. Supp. 1291 
(D. Del. 1970). 
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plaintiff with crude oil.69 In allowing Foreign Sovereign Compulsion, the 
court recognized that: 
Anticompetitive practices compelled by foreign nations are not re-
straints of commerce, as commerce is understood in the Sherman Act, 
because refusal to comply would put an end to commerce. . . . Com-
merce may exist at the will of the government, and to impose liability 
for obedience to that will would eliminate for many companies the abil-
ity to transact business in foreign lands. Were compulsion not a de-
fense, American firms abroad faced with a government order would 
have to choose one country or the other in which to do business. The 
Sherman Act does not go so far.70 
Relying on the Act of State doctrine, the court in Interamerican Refin-
ing Corp. also explicitly held that it would be irrelevant and improper for 
the court to explore whether or not the compulsion itself was a valid or 
legal action under Venezuelan law.71 
Thus, the Foreign Sovereign Compulsion defense provides relief for 
the rare situation when a defendant is caught between a rock and a hard 
place, in that the laws of one state obliged the defendant to take the ac-
tion that is illegal in the United States.72 It applies only narrowly, how-
ever, because the foreign law must be “obligatory” rather than only 
“permissive” of the defendant’s actions.73 Thus, a defendant is not auto-
matically able to assert the defense just because the foreign government 
somehow was involved in or approved of the conduct.74 
Furthermore, the U.S. Supreme Court made clear in Hartford Fire In-
surance Co. v. California that the defendant must do more than claim 
that the foreign law conflicted with U.S. law to obtain the Foreign Sove-
reign Compulsion shield.75 In that case, the London-based defendant 
reinsurers argued that although U.S. law prohibited its conduct in fixing 
commercial insurance policy terms, the same acts were “perfectly consis-
                                                                                                             
 69. See id. at 1296. 
 70. Id. at 1298 (citations omitted). 
 71. See id. at 1298–99. 
 72. HOLMES, supra note 44, § 8:10. See generally Boscariol, supra note 67 (highlight-
ing the difficulties faced by Canadian companies where U.S. law restricted trade with 
Cuba, while Canadian law prohibited compliance with the U.S. restrictions). One politi-
cian memorably characterized the conflicting laws situation as giving companies a 
“choice between being hit with a bat or a brick.” Id. at 484 (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 73. VAKERICS, supra note 49, § 12.05. 
 74. Id. 
 75. HOLMES, supra note 44, § 8:10 n.15. 
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tent” with British laws.76 The Supreme Court held that the compulsion 
defense does not apply merely upon a showing of a facial conflict in the 
laws; rather, the defendant had to show that the foreign law required it to 
violate U.S. law, and that it could not possibly have complied with both 
laws.77 
A defendant in a U.S. antitrust action may thus assert a Foreign Sove-
reign Compulsion defense only if “the foreign sovereign has compelled 
the very conduct that the U.S. antitrust law prohibits.”78 According to 
U.S. enforcement agencies, the defense only applies when three criteria 
are fulfilled:79 
First, the foreign government must have compelled the anticompetitive 
conduct under circumstances in which a refusal to comply with the for-
eign government’s command would give rise to the imposition of penal 
or other severe sanctions . . . Second, . . . the defense normally applies 
only when the foreign government compels conduct which can be ac-
complished entirely within its own territory. . . . Third . . . the order 
must come from the foreign government acting in its governmental ca-
pacity.80 
                                                                                                             
 76. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 798–99 (1993). 
 77. Id. at 799. The arguments in Hartford were couched in terms of the comity doc-
trine. Id. However, given the focus on conflict of laws and the overlap between the two 
doctrines, commentators have recognized the importance of the case in identifying a limit 
to the foreign sovereign compulsion doctrine as well. HOLMES, supra note 44, § 8:10 
n.15. 
 78. U.S. Dep’t of Justice & Fed. Trade Comm’n, Antitrust Enforcement Guidelines 
for International Operations § 3.32 (1995), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/internat.htm [hereinafter ANTITRUST 
ENFORCEMENT GUIDELINES]. 
 79. Id. The enforcement agencies use these criteria to determine, before instituting a 
public antitrust suit, whether the facts of the case support a foreign sovereign compulsion 
defense. If the criteria are fulfilled so that the defense is implicated, the “[a]gencies will 
refrain from enforcement actions on the ground of foreign sovereign compulsion.” Id.   
Thus the Executive Branch has built deference to foreign sovereign decision-making into 
its enforcement policies as a threshold matter, so that a colorable foreign sovereign com-
pulsion claim is probably far less likely to show up in a public antitrust litigation. As an 
expression of Executive Branch policy, therefore, the guidelines should be instructive, 
although not binding, for courts hearing antitrust cases brought by private plaintiffs, who 
have absolutely no obligation to consider these factors prior to instituting a suit. In a pri-
vate suit, the court would be wise to look to these guidelines and related jurisprudence 
(sua sponte, if necessary) so as to ensure that the court’s exercise of jurisdiction does not 
impede on the Executive Branch’s domain.    
 80. Id.  
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If the facts indicate that all three criteria are met, the Foreign Sove-
reign Compulsion doctrine applies so as to provide defendants with a 
“predictable rule of decision,” and foreign governments with “due defe-
rence to [their] official acts” as equal sovereigns.81 Thus, the doctrine is 
based on fairness to corporate actors who make business decisions under 
the laws of a foreign sovereign but who are subject to U.S. jurisdiction 
and antitrust laws based on the effects of that business decision or con-
duct.82 
C. Comity Doctrine 
As the U.S. Supreme Court characterized it over 100 years ago, the 
doctrine of Comity83 is 
neither a matter of absolute obligation, on the one hand, nor of mere 
courtesy and good will, upon the other. But it is the recognition which 
one nation allows within its territory to the legislative, executive or 
judicial acts of another nation, having due regard both to international 
duty and convenience, and to the rights of its own citizens, or of other 
persons who are under the protection of its laws.84 
Like the Act of State doctrine, Comity is a doctrine of judicial abstention 
based on respect for sovereignty.85 Rather than requiring automatic dis-
missal whenever the facts of a case implicate significant interests of a 
                                                                                                             
 81. Id. 
 82. While an in-depth discussion of extraterritorial antitrust jurisdiction is beyond the 
scope of this Note, the general idea is that “[a]nticompetitive conduct that [substantially] 
affects U.S. domestic or foreign commerce may violate the U.S. antitrust laws regardless 
of where such conduct occurs or the nationality of the parties involved.” Id. § 3.1. Chi-
nese manufacturers, for example, may conduct all of their business in Chinese territory 
subject to Chinese law but become subject to U.S. jurisdiction based on significant ex-
ports to or market effect in the United States. 
 83. The doctrine is interchangeably referred to by courts and scholars as “comity,” 
“international comity,” or “comity of nations.” See, e.g., Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 
165 (1895) (referring to the debate over whether “comity” or “comity of nations” are 
appropriate or adequate terms for the doctrine); 44B AM. JUR. 2D International Law § 8 
(2009). The notion of comity can also be used to refer to the mutual respect for the sove-
reignty of the domestic states of the United States, in that the courts of the forum state 
will usually apply the substantive law of another state to claims that arise in that state. 
44B AM. JUR. 2D International Law § 8 (2009). International Comity encompasses this 
same conflict of laws approach, but may be “best understood as a guide for the court, in 
construing a statute, where the issues to be resolved are entangled in international rela-
tions.” Id. 
 84. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163–64 (1895). 
 85. See 44B AM. JUR. 2D International Law § 8 (2009). 
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foreign sovereign, however, the Comity doctrine allows the court to ana-
lyze and weigh all relevant factors to determine whether it should “defer 
to the laws or interests of a foreign country and decline to exercise the 
jurisdiction [it] otherwise [has].”86 
According to U.S. antitrust enforcement agency guidelines on Comi-
ty,87 which closely mirror the factors established by the Ninth Circuit in 
the landmark case Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, N.T. & 
S.A., relevant factors to the Comity analysis in the antitrust context in-
clude: 
1. the relative significance to the alleged violation of conduct within 
the United States, as compared to conduct abroad; 
2. the nationality of the persons involved in or affected by the con-
duct; 
3. the presence or absence of a purpose to affect U.S. consumers, 
markets, or exporters; 
4. the relative significance and foreseeability of the effects of the 
conduct on the United States as compared to the effects abroad; 
5. the existence of reasonable expectations that would be furthered or 
defeated by the action; 
6. the degree of conflict with foreign law or articulated foreign eco-
nomic policies; 
                                                                                                             
 86. Id.; see also Animal Sci. Prods., Inc. v. China Nat’l Metals & Minerals Imp. & 
Exp. Corp., 596 F. Supp. 2d 842, 864 n.17 (D.N.J. 2008) (“[T]he legal doctrine of inter-
national comity is . . . a judicial tradition based on respect for sovereignty, a discretionary 
power of the court to decline jurisdiction in international cases out of respect for the ac-
tions and laws of another nation, which are weighed against United States international 
convenience and duties.”). 
 87. These factors are considered as a matter of course in international antitrust en-
forcement activities by agencies of the Executive Branch, and thus, a suit brought by a 
public enforcement agency is usually taken as an indication that U.S. interests in en-
forcement outweighed comity concerns. See ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT GUIDELINES, su-
pra note 78, § 3.2. In private antitrust disputes involving international issues the U.S. 
courts must engage in a very similar analysis to determine whether to exercise Sherman 
Act jurisdiction. See, e.g., Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, N.T. & S.A., 549 
F.2d 597, 613 (9th Cir. 1976) (noting that in private suits the court’s comity analysis 
becomes even more important because “there is no opportunity for the executive Branch 
to weigh the foreign relations impact, nor any statement implicit in the filing of the suit 
that that consideration has been outweighed.”). 
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7. the extent to which the enforcement activities of another country 
with respect to the same persons, including remedies resulting from 
those activities, may be affected; and 
8.  the effectiveness of foreign enforcement as compared to U.S. en-
forcement action.88 
Thus, Comity is clearly at issue whenever there is a direct conflict be-
tween U.S. law and the laws of a foreign sovereign, and thereby overlaps 
with the doctrine of Foreign Sovereign Compulsion, discussed supra in 
Section II.B.89 More importantly, however, Comity under the Timberlane 
balancing approach encompasses broader considerations of respect for 
the sovereignty of independent nations that allow the court to consider 
dismissal even in the absence of a direct conflict of laws.90 Conversely, 
the balancing analysis also gives the court discretion to exercise jurisdic-
tion despite the presence of significant Comity considerations “if it finds 
that the extension of comity would be contrary or prejudicial to the inter-
est of the United States.”91 Courts using this balancing approach are thus 
essentially asking whether asserting jurisdiction would be reasonable 
given the specific circumstances in the case. 
The decision in Hartford Fire, discussed supra, could be construed as 
rejecting the balancing approach and limiting the Comity defense to situ-
ations where there is a “true conflict” between U.S. and foreign law such 
that Comity and Foreign Sovereign Compulsion would become indistin-
guishable.92 However, many scholars have criticized the decision, noting 
that the modern trend seems to be moving in the direction of the more 
                                                                                                             
 88. ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT GUIDELINES, supra note 78. 
 89. See id. (noting that direct conflicts are defined according to the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Hartford Fire, 509 U.S. at 799, and that these direct conflicts occur increa-
singly less frequently in the antitrust context as nations continue to coordinate in the de-
sign of their respective competition laws). 
 90. Id. 
 91. 44B AM. JUR. 2D International Law § 8 (2009); see also Timberlane Lumber Co. 
v. Bank of America, N.T. & S.A., 549 F.2d 597, 613 (9th Cir. 1976) (indicating that a 
weighing of comity concerns is one required part of a tripartite test to determine whether 
the court should exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction in an international antitrust case, but 
that comity may be outweighed by other factors), superseded by statute, Foreign Trade 
Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-290, 96 Stat. 1246, as recognized in 
McGlinchy v. Shell Chem. Co., 845 F.2d 802, 814 n.8 (9th Cir. 1988) (noting that while 
the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982 (“FTAIA”) now governs the 
reach of extraterritorial jurisdiction in cases brought under the Sherman Act, Congress 
specifically expressed that the passage of the FTAIA would not change the ability of the 
courts to exercise principles of international comity). 
 92. Spencer Weber Waller, Antitrust and American Business Abroad § 6:21 (2009). 
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robust interpretation of comity supported by Justice Scalia’s dissent in 
Hartford Fire.93 Even the majority opinion in Hartford Fire explicitly 
refused to address “other considerations that might inform a decision to 
refrain from the exercise of jurisdiction on grounds of international comi-
ty.”94 The decision can therefore be construed more expansively to indi-
cate that “litigants are free to make comity arguments relying on the oth-
er factors outlined in the cases and the Restatements, but may not rely 
upon the conflict between national policies, unless the conflict rises to 
the level of outright compulsion.”95 Additionally, the Supreme Court’s 
strong emphasis on Comity considerations in refusing to exercise juris-
diction over a foreign plaintiff’s antitrust claims in a more recent case, F. 
Hoffman-Laroche, Ltd. v. Empagran, supports this interpretation and 
signals a return to the balancing approach embodied in Timberlane and 
Justice Scalia’s dissent in Hartford Fire.96 
III. RECENT APPLICATION OF SOVEREIGNTY-BASED DEFENSES IN A 
FEDERAL ANTITRUST CASE: IN RE VITAMIN C ANTITRUST LITIGATION 
In late 2008, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New 
York denied a motion to dismiss on grounds of the three sovereignty-
                                                                                                             
 93. See id. (“The Court ignored any requirement of reasonableness in the exercise of 
jurisdiction and then quoted the Third Restatement out of context to support a flawed 
argument that only foreign compulsion can create a true conflict justifying abstention on 
comity grounds.”); Joseph P. Griffin, E.C. and U.S. Extraterritoriality: Activism and 
Cooperation, 17 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 353, 367–68 (1994) (Scalia, writing for four dissen-
ters, “stated that ‘rarely would [the factors set forth in the Restatement (Third) of Foreign 
Relations] point more clearly against application of United States law. The activity . . . 
took place primarily in the United Kingdom, and the defendants in these counts are Brit-
ish corporations and British subjects having their principal place of business . . . outside 
the United States. . . . I think it unimaginable that an assertion of legislative jurisdiction 
by the United States would be considered reasonable’” in such circumstances (quoting 
Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 509 U.S. at 818).); Siddharth Fernandes & F. Hoffman-Laroche, 
LTD. v. Empagran and the Extraterritorial Limits of United States Antitrust Jurisdiction: 
Where Comity and Deterrence Collide, 20 CONN. J. INT’L L. 267, 279 (2005) (noting that 
“though Hartford Fire still stands, it seems to have been severely cabined by the [subse-
quent enactment of the] FTAIA and subsequent decisions” such as Empagran that give 
comity considerable weight in interpreting the reach of U.S. extraterritorial antitrust ju-
risdiction). 
 94. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 799 (1993). 
 95. Waller, supra note 92, § 6:21. 
 96. See Fernandes, supra note 93, at 279–84. 
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based defenses the consolidated private antitrust claims97 brought against 
four Chinese manufacturers of vitamin C by U.S. purchasers.98 The 
plaintiffs’ claims stem from the defendant manufacturers’ swift rise to 
dominance of the world market for vitamin C in recent years—a situation 
plaintiffs allege was aided by collusive, anticompetitive horizontal price-
fixing among the defendants.99 Chinese vitamin manufacturers started to 
gain control of the vitamin C market after a European manufacturer price 
cartel (which had until then controlled the market) broke up in 1995.100 
Plaintiffs allege that in December 2001, the defendant manufacturers 
formed their own cartel with the help of their trade association, the 
Chamber of Commerce of Medicines and Health Products Importers & 
Exporters101 (“the Chamber”), and agreed “to control prices and the vo-
lume of exports for vitamin C.”102 This collusion allegedly caused an 84 
percent increase in the average price per kilogram for vitamin C in 2002, 
with prices “in the United States [increasing] from approximately $2.50 
per kilogram . . . to as high as $7 per kilogram.”103 Prices spiked as high 
as $15 per kilogram in 2003, a result of “the combination of the cartel’s 
supply restrictions and increases in world demand . . . attributable . . . to 
                                                                                                             
 97. Specifically, plaintiffs brought suit under Section 1 of the Sherman Act and Sec-
tions 4 and 16 of the Clayton Act. See In re Vitamin C Antitrust Litig., 584 F. Supp. 2d 
546, 548 (E.D.N.Y. 2008). 
 98. See generally id. 
 99. See id. at 549 (“[D]efendants’ sales constitute approximately 60 percent of the 
worldwide vitamin C market and virtually 100 percent of the manufacturers who can 
produce vitamin C for a cost below $4.50 to $5 per kilogram.”) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 100. See id. at 548 (noting that the European cartel disbanded after being sued for con-
spiring to “suppress competition and fix prices”); Kate Fazzini, Antitrust Suit Proceeds 
Against Chinese Vitamin C Makers, LAW.COM (Nov. 13, 2008), 
http://www.law.com/jsp/law/LawArticleFriendly.jsp?id=1202425997056 (“In the late 
1990s and early 2000s, vitamin price-fixing cases were brought against European manu-
facturers, leading to multi-billion dollar settlements with the U.S. government, European 
Commission and other entities, including businesses and retailers.”). 
 101. Plaintiffs’ complaint apparently calls this group the “Western Medicine Depart-
ment of the Association of Importers and Exporters of Medicines and Health Products of 
China.” In re Vitamin C Antitrust Litig., 584 F. Supp. 2d at 549. However, in its amicus 
brief, the Chinese Ministry of Commerce asserts that the correct name is the “Chamber of 
Commerce of Medicines and Health Products Importers & Exporters.” Id. at 552. Given 
the difficulties with translation in complex international litigation and the lack of transpa-
rency in the Chinese system, for consistency’s sake this Note will defer to the Chinese 
government’s name for the group. 
 102. Id. at 549. 
 103. Id. 
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the outbreak of SARS.”104 Subsequent cuts in prices by individual cartel 
members were allegedly reined in at an “emergency meeting” called by 
the Chamber in late 2003, where Chamber members, including defen-
dants, “devised plans to rationalize the market and limit production le-
vels and increase prices.”105 Defendants purportedly dealt with 2004 
price declines by agreeing to “shut down production for equipment main-
tenance in order to boost prices back toward their 2003 high, [and to] 
restrict exports to the United States to further stabilize prices.”106 
In response to these allegations, defendants moved to dismiss the com-
plaint by invoking the Act of State, Foreign Sovereign Compulsion, and 
Comity doctrines, insisting that “their actions were compelled by the 
Chinese Ministry of Commerce” (“the Ministry”).107 In its first ever ami-
cus curiae appearance before a U.S. court, the Chinese government 
(through the Ministry) submitted and argued an amicus brief in support 
of defendants’ position.108 The Ministry asserted that the Chamber was 
established in 1991 “as an entity under the Ministry’s direct and active 
supervision [and] plays a central role in regulating China’s vitamin C 
industry” as a social organization “imbu[ed] . . . with governmental regu-
latory authority.”109 Essentially, once Chinese market-oriented reforms 
reduced the number of directly regulated SOEs in the early 1990s, the 
state handed over the regulatory reins for many industries to the Minis-
try, which in turn created entities such as the Chamber to “[step] into the 
shoes of the state-owned national exporting entities.”110 In this way, 
“chambers of commerce in China have played a central role in China’s 
shift from a command economy to a market economy.”111 
According to the Ministry, in 1997 the Ministry and the State Drug 
Administration (“SDA”) responded to tough competition on the global 
market for vitamin C by ordering the Chamber to establish a group “to 
coordinate with respect to [the] vitamin C export market, price and cus-
tomers, and to organize the enterprises in contacting foreign entities.”112 
                                                                                                             
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. at 550. 
 108. See id. at 552. The Ministry represents the Chinese government in its capacity as 
“the highest administrative authority in China authorized to regulate foreign trade, . . . the 
equivalent . . . of a cabinet level department in the U.S. governmental system.” Id. (inter-
nal quotations omitted). 
 109. Id. at 552–53. 
 110. Id. at 552. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. at 553 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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The Ministry left it to the Chamber to determine “the specific method for 
coordination” and to file that method with the Ministry.113 
Subsequently, and presumably to comply with the order, the Chamber 
formed and received Ministry approval for a “Vitamin C Sub-
Committee” made up of major vitamin C exporters.114 According to the 
charter for the sub-committee, only its members would “have the right to 
export [v]itamin C and are simultaneously qualified to have [v]itamin C 
export quota.” Members of the sub-committee were required to “volunta-
rily adjust their production outputs according to changes of supplies and 
demands on international markets . . . and strictly execute [the] export 
coordinated price set by the Chamber and keep it confidential.”115 The 
penalties for non-compliance included “warning, open criticism and even 
revocation of . . . membership,” and ultimately a suggestion “to the com-
petent governmental department, through the Chamber, to suspend and 
even cancel the [v]itamin C export right of such violating member.”116 
The regulatory framework for Chinese exports changed to a “price ve-
rification and chop” method in 2002 in response to China’s accession to 
the World Trade Organization (“WTO”).117 Under the new system, 
chambers of commerce have to verify all export contracts and approve 
the specific price and quantity before shipments can be released by Cus-
toms.118 
In response to the defendants’ and Ministry’s contentions, the plaintiffs 
argued that (1) none of these facts “pointed to a single law or regulation 
compelling a price or price agreement,” (2) the claimed collusion did not 
occur until years after the establishment of the sub-committee that sup-
posedly compelled price-fixing, and (3) records of the Chamber and sub-
committee referring to self-restraint measures and hand voting evidenced 
the voluntary nature of the agreements to fix prices.119 
In ruling on the motion to dismiss, the court held that the Ministry’s 
brief, while “entitled to substantial deference, [was] not conclusive evi-
dence of compulsion, particularly where, as here, the plain language of 
the documentary evidence submitted by plaintiffs directly contradicts the 
Ministry’s position.”120 The court then denied the motion in order to al-
                                                                                                             
 113. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 114. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 115. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 116. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 117. Id. at 553–54. 
 118. Id. at 554. 
 119. Id. 
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low further factual development on the issue of compulsion.121 The court 
hoped further discovery would resolve ambiguity in the record as to 
“whether defendants were performing government function, whether 
they were acting as private citizens pursuant to governmental directives 
or whether they were acting as unrestrained private citizens.”122 
IV. REEXAMINING IN RE VITAMIN C ANTITRUST LITIGATION: WHY U.S. 
COURTS SHOULD CONSTRUE SOVEREIGNTY-BASED DEFENSES BROADLY 
WHERE CHINA’S ROLE IS AMBIGUOUS 
The district court in In re Vitamin C Antitrust Litigation took a con-
servative, wait-and-see approach to the assertion of sovereignty-based 
defenses due to a record it deemed “simply too ambiguous to foreclose 
further inquiry into the voluntariness of defendants’ actions.”123 Howev-
er, reexamination of the court’s reasoning and the facts of the case re-
veals a strong argument rooted in both policy and case law for construing 
sovereignty-based defenses broadly at the pre-trial stage in ambiguous 
cases. An expansive construction is especially prudent where a foreign 
sovereign like the Chinese Ministry of Commerce makes an official 
statement expressing its interest or explaining its role in the subject of the 
litigation. 
The court’s reasoning in In re Vitamin C Antitrust Litigation masks the 
strength of the sovereignty-based defenses by failing to examine each of 
them in turn, even though they are conceptually distinct and successful 
establishment of any one of them could warrant dismissal. While the 
court delineated the rules of each of the three doctrines asserted by the 
Chinese manufacturers, it focused its analysis on the authority of the 
Ministry’s brief and the Foreign Sovereign Compulsion defense, argua-
bly the narrowest of the three.124 Therefore, the following Sections reex-
amine the applicability of the three sovereignty-based defenses in turn 
and suggest why a broad construction may be warranted by the factual 
circumstances of this litigation. 
                                                                                                             
 121. Id. at 559. 
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 124. See id. at 557–59. The court begins its legal analysis by stating that “the issue at 
this stage of the case is whether there is a factual dispute as to the alleged compulsion,” 
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360 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 36:1 
A. Act of State Doctrine 
Pursuant to the two-step Act of State analysis established in Kirkpa-
trick, the court should have initially examined whether the success of the 
plaintiffs’ complaint would require a ruling on the validity of a Chinese 
state action.125 The court seemed to accept that any involvement by the 
Chinese government in price-fixing constituted a public, rather than 
commercial, state act, thereby removing any speculation that a commer-
cial activity exception may apply where export regulation is con-
cerned.126 Therefore, the denial of the motion to dismiss implies that 
some doubt remained as to whether it was necessary to rule on the validi-
ty of a state action. 
In Hunt v. Mobil Oil Corp., the Second Circuit made clear that plain-
tiffs cannot escape the application of the doctrine through skillful plead-
ing that avoids explicitly questioning the validity or legality of the gov-
ernment’s acts. Rather, the doctrine still applies as long as a nexus with 
the state action is at the heart of the plaintiff’s claim, such that the court 
has to look at the act and the government motivation behind it.127 In so 
deciding, the Hunt court indicated that pleadings do raise issues of the 
legality or validity of state acts if they characterize government actors as 
“co-conspirators.”128 
Here, the allegations in the complaint implicitly required the court to 
look at the Chinese government’s export policies for vitamin C and de-
termine whether the government’s motivation was to fix prices in re-
straint of trade. The plaintiffs characterized the Chamber as a “co-
conspirator” in the complaint and referred numerous times to the role the 
Chamber played, under Ministry direction, in instigating and coordinat-
ing the price-fixing meetings that form the crux of the complaint.129 
Plaintiffs alleged that they were harmed by an increase in prices for vi-
                                                                                                             
 125. W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co., Inc. v. Envtl. Tectonics Corp., Int’l, 493 U.S. 400, 406 
(1990). 
 126. See In re Vitamin C Antitrust Litig., 584 F. Supp. 2d at 550 n.4 (“[D]efendants 
and the Ministry have made a compelling argument for why the Chinese government’s 
involvement—to the extent it exists—in defendants’ price-fixing scheme amounts to a 
public, rather than commercial, act.”). 
 127. See Hunt v. Mobil Oil Corp., 550 F.2d 68, 76–77 (2d Cir. 1977). 
 128. Id. at 76. 
 129. See In re Vitamin C Antitrust Litig., 584 F. Supp. 2d at 549 (“According to the 
complaints . . . defendants and their co-conspirators formed a cartel;” “At a meeting of 
the [Association, a.k.a. the Chamber,] . . . defendants and the Association . . . reached an 
agreement;” “The complaints further allege that the agreements of the cartel members 
were facilitated by the efforts of their trade association;” “Plaintiffs allege that the Asso-
ciation called an ‘emergency meeting’ . . . to rationalize the market.” (emphasis added)). 
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tamin C that was caused “as a result of the meetings and other efforts by 
cartel members,” which they took pains to point out were accomplished 
at each step under the auspices of the Chamber.130 The acts of the Cham-
ber and the defendant manufacturers were inextricably intertwined in the 
allegations to the extent that ruling on defendants’ liability would amount 
to passing judgment on the Chamber’s actions as well. 
The court’s focus on the factual dispute over compulsion failed to ac-
knowledge the broader scope of the Act of State doctrine, which is not 
necessarily dependent on government compulsion. The parties strongly 
disputed the voluntariness of the defendants’ specific pricing decisions, 
but did not challenge the Ministry’s detailed explanation, in its amicus 
brief, of China’s overall export control system, fear of excessive compe-
tition and antidumping duties, and delegation of regulatory authority to 
the Chamber as a key facet in its transition to a market-oriented econo-
my.131 The amicus brief submitted by the Ministry outlined these practic-
es (including serious penalties for noncompliance) in great detail and 
represented the Chinese government’s official characterization of the 
Chamber as a “government-mandated price and output control re-
gime.”132 Regardless of whether the Ministry and Chamber actually 
compelled price-fixing in this instance, the causal link alleged by plain-
tiffs between defendants’ and the Chamber’s acts necessarily required 
the Court to examine the motivations and actions of the Chinese gov-
ernment in setting up such a system. 
Furthermore, to rule on plaintiff’s request for an injunction (whether 
granting or denying it) would be tantamount to either sanctioning Chi-
na’s means of regulating its domestic industry, or instructing the gov-
ernment that it must “alter its chosen means of regulating domestic con-
duct.”133 China’s status as a non-market economy and major U.S. trading 
partner further exacerbate the potential impact of such a ruling on politi-
cal relations between the two countries. This is precisely the situation of 
judicial overreaching into foreign affairs that the Act of State doctrine is 
intended to avoid. Thus the Act of State doctrine is, at a minimum, tech-
nically available to the court in this case. 
Under Kirkpatrick, technical availability does not ensure dismissal but 
merely indicates that the court may exercise discretion in deciding 
whether to apply the doctrine based on the policies that underlie it, such 
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 131. See generally Ministry Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 9. 
 132. Id. at 3. 
 133. Id. at 22–23 (citing Int’l Ass’n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Org. of 
Petrol. Exporting Countries, 649 F.2d 1354, 1361 (9th Cir. 1981)). 
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as comity, the location of the acts, and potential conflict with the Execu-
tive Branch.134 In this case, comity considerations are strongly impli-
cated, as is discussed infra in Section IV.C. All acts which could be attri-
buted to Chinese sovereign entities took place in China’s territory. Final-
ly, there is a high possibility for conflict with, or embarrassment to, the 
Executive Branch in its conduct of foreign relations. 
This last factor is supported by the depth of the Chinese government’s 
interest in the outcome of the case and its willingness to come forward 
and unambiguously state—for the first time in a U.S. court—that it is 
responsible for the price-fixing that occurred here.135 Clearly, such a 
statement suggests that China views this price control system for exports 
as a necessary part of its shift to a market-oriented system. Additionally, 
the acts at issue occurred during a time of great transition in China’s 
economy—it acceded to the World Trade Organization in 2001, a mo-
mentous event but one that made the government’s concerns over exces-
sive competition and foreign anti-dumping suits all the more acute.136 
Furthermore, China has since taken steps to curb such activities through 
the enactment of the AML with its specific prohibitions against illegal 
price-fixing through trade associations. 
The U.S. Executive Branch has a considerable interest in cooperating 
with other nations in antitrust enforcement against global cartels. How-
ever, there is a significant possibility that these cooperation efforts could 
be hampered by the exercise of U.S. jurisdiction over Chinese manufac-
turers despite a mea culpa from the Chinese government.137 This is the 
                                                                                                             
 134. W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co., Inc. v. Envtl. Tectonics Corp., Int’l, 493 U.S. 400, 408 
(1990). 
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first time U.S. plaintiffs have subjected Chinese manufacturers to a U.S. 
antitrust suit138 and the possibility of treble damages that go along with 
it. A zealous application of extraterritorial jurisdiction in the face of the 
Ministry’s admission of state responsibility could prompt China to enact 
clawback or blocking legislation to protect its domestic manufacturers 
from such suits in the future.139 Since the price control system at issue 
here was enacted partly as a protective measure in response to foreign 
anti-dumping suits, it seems likely that China would react just as strongly 
to the possibility that this case would set off a deluge of antitrust suits 
targeting Chinese industry leaders, this time carrying the possibility of 
treble damages. Therefore, deeming these acts to be invalid or illegal 
could significantly interfere with the Executive’s ability to decide how to 
calibrate cooperation with China on antitrust enforcement and could sig-
nificantly hamper foreign relations with China, one of the United States’ 
most important trading partners. If the Executive Branch wants to chal-
lenge the legitimacy of China’s policy, it can do so in a carefully calcu-
lated fashion through diplomatic channels or the WTO dispute resolution 
system.140 Indeed, the United States Trade Representative has since in-
itiated dispute proceedings at the WTO to challenge China’s “export re-
strictions applied to nine raw materials used as inputs for the steel, alu-
                                                                                                             
possibility of insult to China is significant—the granting of any relief would in effect 
amount to an order from a domestic court instructing a foreign sovereign to alter its cho-
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 138. China’s Vitamin C Makers Ready for Anti-trust Battle, DECISIONNEWSMEDIA, 
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 139. See VAKERICS, supra note 49, § 12.04 (“Efforts to obtain evidence located in 
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minum and chemicals industries [as violative of] China’s 2001 WTO 
accession agreement.”141 Since WTO disputes address only state actions, 
this is a critical sign that the U.S. Executive Branch considers China’s 
export constraints a matter controlled by Chinese government and law. 
Thus the balance of considerations warrants dismissal on Act of State 
grounds, even without adopting a “broad” construction of the doctrine. 
B. Foreign Sovereign Compulsion Doctrine 
The Foreign Sovereign Compulsion doctrine is the narrowest of the 
three defenses, but it is at the heart of the defendant’s and the Ministry’s 
arguments for dismissal in this case. In the United States, horizontal 
price-fixing is a per se violation of the Sherman Act, so it is clear that, 
barring jurisdictional constraints, fixing export prices for vitamin C con-
stitutes a violation of U.S. law. The alleged conduct occurred wholly on 
Chinese territory. Furthermore, Chinese regulations make severe penal-
ties, including revocation of the export license for vitamin C, imposable 
on manufacturers that fail to comply with price coordination.142 There-
fore, the key consideration remaining in the compulsion analysis is 
whether the defendants’ acts in fixing prices were just permitted or truly 
compelled by the Chinese government. 
Arguably, the establishment of penalties itself should be sufficient evi-
dence that the government compelled price coordination. The court’s 
focus on voluntariness seems misplaced if Chinese policy made severe 
sanctions possible. For example, the court indicated that the plaintiffs’ 
voluntariness argument would be stronger if discovery showed that Chi-
nese manufacturers actually adhered to a pricing scheme only after they 
achieved market power, despite an earlier mandate to do so by the 
Chamber and subcommittee.143 However, once a governmental mandate 
is issued, it should hardly matter whether or not the defendants managed 
to avoid sanction for previous noncompliance. A failure to penalize does 
not dilute the legal force of the mandate itself.144 The court seems to ac-
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knowledge as much earlier in its decision, where it cites O.N.E. Shipping 
Ltd. v. Flota Mercante Grancolombiana, S.A. as a clearer case for dis-
missal where the Colombian government suddenly “began enforcing a 
series of cargo reservation laws it had passed years before.”145 Even 
though the defendants in that case allegedly engineered the renewed en-
forcement of the protectionist laws, the court dismissed on Act of State 
grounds.146 Similarly here, the fact that implementation, enforcement, 
and penalties for failure to conform pricing may have been unevenly ap-
plied early on should not negate the compulsory nature of the state regu-
lation. Nonetheless the court found O.N.E. Shipping Ltd., where laws had 
gone completely unenforced for years, to present a clearer case of com-
pulsion.  
The real difference between the compulsion analyses in these cases, 
then, seems to be the uncodified nature of much of the Chinese regulato-
ry system. The court likely was not comfortable hanging a dismissal on 
the circulars and notices typically used in the Chinese system of regula-
tion, as opposed to the codified statutes typical of a U.S. or European 
style system. Indeed, the court distinguishes this case from others relied 
upon by defendants by stating that those dismissals “involved much 
clearer examples of government compulsion,” but the increased clarity 
seems to be only a function of the U.S.-style codification of the laws in 
those cases.147 
For instance, the court asserts that while Trugman-Nash, Inc. v. New 
Zealand Dairy Board was dismissed based on sovereignty-based de-
fenses, the case involved “a formally codified New Zealand law” provid-
ing guidance to the Dairy Board on the granting of export licenses.148 
However, the facts of Trugman-Nash were arguably even less clear-cut 
on compulsion than those in the Vitamin C case. The New Zealand sta-
tute, in the Trugman-Nash court’s view, was “not a model of clarity” and 
“cast in permissive terms” that gave the Dairy Board at least facial dis-
cretion over whether protectionist factors warranted a denial of an export 
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license.149 In fact, it was only upon reconsideration of the case after an 
initial denial of defendants’ motion to dismiss that the court was finally 
convinced that the Act actually compelled the denial of export licenses 
(and thus, price competition) for the United States.150 The court reasoned 
that although the “mandate is not cast in the terms of a Biblical com-
mandment, ‘Thou shalt not,’ . . . the statute’s practical effect is the 
same.”151 Contrary to the Vitamin C court’s assertion, then, it would 
seem that Trugman-Nash provided ample persuasive authority to dismiss 
on foreign sovereign compulsion grounds based on fair inferences about 
the practical effects of a regulation lacking transparency. 
For reasons described under the Act of State analysis, supra, Section 
IV.A, if the court faced any ambiguity on this front it should have de-
ferred to the Ministry’s official statement detailing how defendants were 
compelled by Chinese regulations to join the subcommittee, coordinate 
an industry-wide price, and limit production, all under penalty of severe 
sanctions.152 The court cited Karaha Bodas Co., LLC v. Pertamina for 
the proposition that “[w]here a choice between two interpretations of 
ambiguous foreign law rests finely balanced, the support of a foreign 
sovereign for one interpretation furnishes legitimate assistance in the 
resolution of interpretive dilemmas.”153 The court then concluded that, 
while the Ministry’s brief was entitled to “substantial deference,” it did 
not constitute “conclusive evidence of compulsion.”154 However, it ap-
pears that the court’s subsequent analysis failed to accord “substantial 
deference”—or even any additional weight—to the Ministry’s detailed 
brief characterizing its own law and instead relied on the plaintiffs’ ex-
pert on Chinese law.155 This analysis strikes against the “substantial defe-
rence” standard the court announced, and a broader construction of the 
Foreign Sovereign Compulsion doctrine was warranted in this instance 
of ambiguity regarding a foreign law. 
In addition, the court’s own compulsion analysis seems to indicate a 
lack of understanding of the Chinese system of regulation, which is 
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somewhat inexplicable considering the careful explanation provided in 
the Ministry’s brief.156 For example, the court based its decision against 
dismissal largely on Ministry records boasting that the price agreements 
were “self-restraint measures” taken “without any government interven-
tion,”157 evidence of “hand voting” to decide on specific prices, and the 
fact that “Chinese law is not as transparent as that of the United States . . 
. [since] rather than codifying its statutes, the Chinese government appar-
ently frequently governs by regulations promulgated by various minis-
tries.”158 All of these factors are easily explained by the system of gov-
ernment and policy of “industrial self-restraint” employed by the Chinese 
government, discussed supra, and are indicated as such in the Ministry’s 
brief.159 
The court’s focus on “hand voting” to decide on specific prices, for in-
stance, seems misplaced. This method is not surprising or ultimately 
even important, since the Ministry mandated that defendants fix a price 
through industry coordination within the Chamber. Thus, when the Min-
istry boasted that the export restraints were achieved without interven-
tion, this refers to the fact that the Ministry and Chamber did not have to 
impose any of the available sanctions in order to achieve compliance. In 
fact, the defendants’ membership in the subcommittee and participation 
in these “self-restraint” agreements were prerequisites to their right to 
export vitamin C out of China at all. It is unclear how the Chamber 
would have the right to decide that only its members could export vita-
min C if it were not authorized to do as part of a government regulation. 
Thus, it would be impossible for the manufacturers to comply with 
U.S. law and Chinese law at the same time—their home jurisdiction re-
quired them to come to an agreement on a price in order to “prevent dis-
orderly competition” and avoid antidumping suits in the U.S. and else-
where, while the same conduct constitutes a per se antitrust violation in 
the U.S.160 It seems unsatisfying for the court to indicate that because 
these measures are not laid down in statutes, they are not transparent, 
since the implication is that government law applied through coordina-
tion with and pressure on the private sector (common in East Asian 
economies) is somehow less deserving of deference than a western-style 
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codification.161 Moreover, the Ministry’s brief should cure any lack of 
transparency about the practice of governance and industry self-
regulation administered through the Ministry/trade association system. 
Thus the court should have gone further in its analysis of the practical 
effects of the regulatory system on pricing—even if it ultimately did not 
agree with the Ministry’s final conclusions about whether these practices 
constituted compulsion. 
Although the court reserved decision on the Foreign Sovereign Com-
pulsion defense pending further discovery, prolonging the litigation is 
itself a kind of penalty for the defendant manufacturers. U.S. antitrust 
cases, with their expansive discovery rules, are expensive and time-
consuming, particularly for foreign defendants who face additional travel 
and translation costs in order to appear before the court.162 Thus, in the 
face of strong evidence of compulsion and an official statement by a for-
eign sovereign, the court should construe this defense broadly if doing so 
is necessary to preserve the fairness considerations at the heart of the 
doctrine. Such a rule would also promote predictability while maintain-
ing respect for the sovereignty of foreign nations, two underlying poli-
cies of the Foreign Sovereign Compulsion doctrine. 
C. Comity Doctrine 
The Comity doctrine provides support for a dismissal under either of 
the other two doctrines, even in the event the court is unwilling to decide 
the motion on comity alone. As described by Scalia in the dissent to 
Hartford Fire, a comity analysis in the context of a motion to dismiss 
requires the court to consider whether exercising jurisdiction would be 
reasonable in light of several factors.163 One important factor is the de-
gree of conflict between the foreign and U.S. law, discussed in the For-
eign Sovereign Compulsion analysis supra Section IV.B. Other factors, 
had the court seen fit to examine them in detail, would also militate in 
favor of abstaining from exercising jurisdiction. For example, all of the 
acts took place within the territory of China, and the defendants are all of 
Chinese nationality and have their principal place of business in China. 
Additionally, the actions appear to have been aimed at avoiding dumping 
                                                                                                             
 161. See In re Vitamin C Antitrust Litig., 584 F. Supp. 2d at 559 (“Chinese law is not 
as transparent as that of the United States or other constitutional or parliamentary gov-
ernments.”). 
 162. See Robert Pietrzak, Joel M. Mitnick & Henry Ding, Growing Pains: A Road 
Map for Chinese Companies Learning to Live with Complex US Litigation, CHINA LAW 
& PRACTICE, Jan. 2008, at 66. 
 163. See Griffin, supra note 93 and accompanying text. 
2010] MAKING ROOM FOR DIPLOMACY 369 
allegations, and not at harming the U.S. market per se. Finally, the Chi-
nese government indicated through its appearance as amicus its strong 
interest in regulating the activity in question. 
The sole factor in the comity analysis that might give the court pause is 
whether China can be considered to have a comprehensive regulation and 
enforcement scheme for price-fixing, since the AML was not in place at 
the time of the conduct at issue here and its efficacy is still being tested. 
Whether courts in future cases against Chinese manufacturers will con-
sider the newly enacted AML as evidence of a strong interest in regulat-
ing horizontal price-fixing schemes of this nature remains to be seen. 
Regardless of how the court comes out on the enforcement scheme, 
however, the overall balancing of factors in the Comity analysis point 
toward an abstention from jurisdiction in order to respect the sovereignty 
of China. 
V. ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES EMERGING IN THE FEDERAL COURTS 
While In re Vitamin C Antitrust Litigation was a first for U.S. federal 
courts, pre-trial decisions have since been issued in two nearly identical 
price-fixing cases against other Chinese manufacturers in the Western 
District of Pennsylvania, Animal Science Products, Inc. v. China Nation-
al Metals & Minerals Import & Export Corp., and the District of New 
Jersey, Resco Products, Inc. v. Bosai Mineral Group Co., Ltd.164 In both 
cases, the district court considered the Ministry briefs filed in the In re 
Vitamin C Antitrust Litigation case and arrived at a decision favorable to 
defendant manufacturers. Each of these decisions deserves some atten-
tion, as they represent alternative approaches to this factual scenario that 
exhibit greater deference to sovereignty considerations. 
After considering essentially the exact same allegations and sovereign-
ty-based defenses as those explored in In re Vitamin C Antitrust Litiga-
tion, the court in Animal Science Products, Inc. v. China National Metals 
& Minerals Import & Export Corp. arrived at an opposite conclusion. 
Plaintiff consumers of magnesite-based products brought a price-fixing 
putative class action against seventeen “Chinese business entities in-
volved in the sale of magnesite-based products.”165 The magnesite manu-
facturers allegedly fixed prices and engaged in other anticompetitive ac-
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tions through the auspices of their trade association, the “Chamber of 
Commerce of Metals, Minerals & Chemicals Importers & Exporters” 
(“CCCMC”).166 Rather than rely only on the parties’ submissions on 
these claims and the sovereignty-based defenses, however, the court ac-
tively researched evidence from four other proceedings that might bear 
on the foreign sovereign compulsion doctrine.167 
The first such proceeding, a decision in the European Union, “set aside 
a prior EU determination refusing market economy treatment” and hence 
lower antidumping duties, to an individual Chinese exporter that estab-
lished it successfully avoided substantial government intervention in its 
pricing decisions.168 However, due to the degree of difference in the pro-
ceedings and the lack of clarity in the EU decision, the Animal Science 
Products, Inc. court found it would be improper to accord judicial notice 
to this proceeding.169 
Second, the Animal Science Products, Inc. court considered statements 
made by one of the plaintiffs in a countervailing duty petition on Chinese 
magnesite before the International Trade Administration, and found these 
statements amenable to judicial notice.170 Specifically, plaintiff Resco 
Products, Inc. alleged that the Chinese government subsidizes magnesite 
products via preferential loans, export quotas, and imposition of a “min-
imum acceptable export sales price,” in addition to a bidding system that 
awarded export licenses to those manufacturers with the highest export 
prices.171 Essentially, in its countervailing duty petition Resco blamed 
the Chinese government for the same conduct for which Resco’s antitrust 
complaint now alleges the defendants alone were responsible. 
Third, the Animal Science Products, Inc. court took judicial notice of 
the proceedings against bauxite manufacturers in the Western District of 
Pennsylvania, which it noted contains plaintiffs’ arguments that are near-
ly a substantive carbon copy of the magnesite case, only featuring a dif-
ferent product.172 Given that court’s decision to stay proceedings pending 
the outcome of a U.S.-initiated WTO proceeding against China on export 
constraints for bauxite, the Animal Science Products, Inc. court found it 
“logical to . . . consider the CCCMC’s treatment of its entire bauxite sec-
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tion as an indication of the CCCMC’s general modi operandi with regard 
to all members of the CCCMC, including Defendants.”173 
Finally, the court in Animal Science Products, Inc. took judicial no-
tice—and quoted and discussed at considerable length—the court’s deci-
sion and Ministry briefs submitted in the “strikingly similar” In re Vita-
min C Antitrust Litigation case.174 
The Animal Science Products, Inc. court construed defendants’ act of 
state argument as “a mislabeled argument seeking abstention on the basis 
of government compulsion,” and went on to consider each element of the 
compulsion defense in considerable detail.175 At each step of the analy-
sis, the court used the evidence it had taken the initiative to gather from 
other proceedings to inform its decision-making process.176 Significantly, 
the court considered that “a foreign sovereign’s admission of legal com-
pulsion of its subjects might warrant a high— often, nearly binding—
degree of deference, even if the admitted compulsion was based on what 
might be deemed, in American jurisprudence, a form of ‘unwritten 
law.’”177 The court considered “the MOFCOM’s interpretations [of its 
own directives] the final authority unless the Court detects a Chinese le-
gal provision or an alternative MOFCOM’s [sic] statement that clearly 
and convincingly establishes the incorrectness of these interpreta-
tions.”178 Ultimately, the court was convinced by the totality of the evi-
dence that the CCCMC constitutes a government entity, and that “the 
Chinese government indeed compelled compliance with ‘a’ minimum 
price, which—in turn—means that defendants’ conduct prompted by that 
particular compulsion warrants this Court’s abstention.”179 
The decision in Resco Products, Inc. v. Bosai Mineral Group Co., Ltd. 
exhibits considerable deference to separation of powers and sovereignty 
considerations, while maintaining at least temporary jurisdiction over the 
case. Plaintiff purchasers in this case alleged that Chinese manufacturers 
of bauxite fixed prices on bauxite exported to the U.S.180 Defendants as-
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serted the three sovereignty-based defenses in a motion to dismiss, point-
ing to the Ministry brief in the In re Vitamin C Antitrust Litigation case 
and arguing that “price coordination and supply limits were mandated by 
China’s export control regulations and policies” through the CCCMC.181 
Rather than consider the merits of these arguments, however, the court 
decided to stay the proceedings to await the results of a WTO dispute 
proceeding initiated by the USTR “concerning China’s export restric-
tions on various raw materials, including bauxite.”182The court noted that 
the issues in the two proceedings were very similar in their allegations, 
but only differed over “what entity is responsible for the price arrange-
ments—the Chinese government or defendants.”183 Thus, the result of 
the panel has the potential to provide strong persuasive support for the 
act of state allegations brought by the defendants.184 Over plaintiffs’ ob-
jections, the court found that 
To advance discovery now without a final determination in the pending 
WTO proceeding could lead the court to resolve the pending motion to 
dismiss or future dispositive motions in a manner that may be inconsis-
tent with the position of the USTR and the eventual decision rendered 
by the WTO panel. While not dispositive, the WTO panel’s report may 
implicate separation of powers concerns, which would be appropriate 
for this court to consider in determining whether a decision by this 
court would interfere with the [E]xecutive [B]ranch’s conduct of for-
eign policy.185 
Based on these considerations and a careful weighing of judicial econ-
omy, prejudice to plaintiffs, and potential alleviation of discovery bur-
dens on defendants, the court stayed antitrust proceedings “until a final 
report is released by the WTO panel” and denied the motions to dismiss 
without prejudice to renew them after the lifting of the stay.186 
Together, these two decisions indicate that perhaps the federal districts, 
and eventually circuits, will adopt conflicting approaches to sovereignty-
based defenses as applied to Chinese manufacturers accused of price-
fixing through trade associations. As more of these cases make their way 
through U.S. courts, it will be important to monitor and evaluate the dif-
ferent approaches that emerge in order to see which best serves private 
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interests in competition while maintaining respect for the sovereignty of 
other nations. 
CONCLUSION 
The In re Vitamin C Antitrust Litigation decision is an important indi-
cator of the special challenges that courts, governments, and Chinese 
exporters alike will face in what is likely to be a rising tide of antitrust 
suits against Chinese enterprises as they come to prominence on the 
world economic stage. The case illustrates several key lessons for the 
treatment of sovereignty-based defenses by U.S. courts. 
First, courts should not shy away from a nuanced analysis of sove-
reignty-based defenses applying the facts of the case and considering the 
context of the regulatory system employed by the foreign sovereign, 
even if (and perhaps especially if) the system is markedly different from 
an American-style, traditionally market-oriented structure. Decisions 
should be based on rigorous analysis of the underlying policy considera-
tions at stake rather than over-reliance on rhetoric. Well-reasoned, 
thoughtful analysis will help avoid stepping on the toes of important 
trading partners and inviting backlash against harsh or unexpected impo-
sitions of U.S. jurisdiction, particularly when these steps become increas-
ing likely due to a crisis or downturn in the global economy. The court in 
In re Vitamin C Antitrust Litigation can hardly be faulted for adopting a 
wait-and-see approach in light of the complex factual and policy consid-
erations involved and the fact that this was the first such suit against 
Chinese manufacturers. However, a broader construction of sovereignty-
based defenses is available to courts at the motion to dismiss stage. 
Adoption of a broad construction may be particularly favorable where a 
foreign sovereign accepts responsibility for the disputed behavior, where 
the Executive Branch is actively pursuing diplomatic avenues to address 
the alleged conduct, and where further discovery would saddle a defend-
ing party with unusually high costs. 
Second, Chinese manufacturers should take note of the expense and 
rules of U.S. antitrust lawsuits when structuring their international busi-
ness transactions. The more they achieve dominance in the private sector, 
the more likely they are to become the object of complex antitrust 
suits,187 rather than the blunter and legally straightforward antidumping 
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suits to which they are more accustomed. Therefore, these manufacturers 
should take advantage of the newly enacted AML and its prohibitions 
against price-fixing through trade associations to advocate with the Chi-
nese government for clearer policies and implementing regulations to 
enforce these restrictions. Pushing for a more transparent regulatory 
framework will help them to avoid becoming ensnared between conflict-
ing competition laws in the future. Manufacturers should take note that 
after the imposition of the AML, it will become harder to argue that they 
were compelled by their government to fix prices—even if this is de fac-
to occurring behind the scenes. 
Finally, the Chinese government should continue to express strong 
opinions through an amicus role in order to educate U.S. courts about its 
transitioning system and its different views on the role and importance of 
“competition” to its socialist market economy. At the same time, it 
should seek more cooperation with the U.S. and other countries on anti-
trust enforcement in order to head off future clashes that may negatively 
impact its burgeoning private sector. If the AML proves an effective 
framework for enforcement, possibilities for coordination with advanced 
antitrust regimes may even include signing bilateral agreements on 
“positive comity” that allow enforcement and prosecution of ambiguous 
cases in home jurisdictions. Only through more experience regulating 
and enforcing its new AML will China be able to take its place among 
the top competition law authorities in the global economic sphere. 
Laura Zimmerman* 
                                                                                                             
 *  B.A., American University (2005); M.A., American University (2007); J.D., 
Brooklyn Law School (expected 2011). I would like to thank the editorial staff of the 
Brooklyn Journal of International Law for their thoughtful guidance throughout the writ-
ing process. I would also like to thank my family, friends, and Ryan Smith for their tire-
less encouragement during my time in law school. All errors and omissions are my own. 
